Glorious Rivals — Questions and Answers

About This Guide

This companion to Glorious Rivals presents 15 questions that dig into the book’s central arguments about political dysfunction, bipartisan collaboration, and institutional reform. Each answer draws directly on evidence from the chapter outline and retrieved passages, avoiding generic commentary.

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15 Evidence-Grounded Questions

1. Why does the author argue that bipartisanship is not about liking each other?

The author claims bipartisanship works because it is the only effective approach in a divided nation, not because lawmakers should get along. Drawing on college debate strategy, he advocates avoiding head‑on collisions. This idea is introduced in the Prologue, where the creation of the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) is presented as proof that cross‑party negotiation can break policy stalemates. The underlying principle is that functional government requires collaboration as a pragmatic necessity, not a personal preference.

2. How does the 2008 Beijing Olympics symbolize America’s internal challenges?

The chapter “Howling at the Moon” contrasts China’s emergence as a global power with America’s anxious response, pointing to falling income, D+ infrastructure, and collapsing trust. The “unholy trinity” of partisan media, gerrymandering, and campaign money is examined but set aside as not the primary cause of gridlock. Instead, the erosion of collaborative norms and personal relationships is blamed. The house‑in‑a‑storm metaphor redirects attention from external winds (the Olympics, BRICS) to internal structural weakness.

3. Why did Senator Bob Bennett and Senator Chris Dodd succeed on Y2K when other efforts failed?

Bennett (R‑UT) and Dodd (D‑CT) led a special committee that held thirty‑five hearings, issued reports, and spurred a $100 billion preventive effort. They succeeded because they focused on quiet competence rather than media spectacle. According to the Y2K evidence in Chapter 4, they avoided threats to filibuster or embarrass bureaucrats. Their collaboration persisted even while the Clinton impeachment dominated headlines. The 9/11 Report later cited this period as the only time the government “seemed to be acting in concert.”

4. What does the story of Russell Long and Pete Domenici reveal about Senate culture?

In Chapter 3, freshman Senator Domenici sought to impose user fees on barge operators, opposing Finance Chairman Long’s interests. Long respected Domenici’s “adroit parliamentary maneuvering” and gave his word to protect the amendment while Domenici campaigned. After a rival tried to strip the language, Long kept his promise, explaining that the Senate “can only operate if senators can rely on each other’s word.” This incident from the 1980s shows how personal trust once overrode short‑term political victory.

5. How did the “filling the tree” tactic escalate over time?

The procedure of filling the amendment tree was first used by Robert Byrd in 1980. Byrd and his successor George Mitchell each used it three times. Trent Lott used it eleven times, Bill Frist fifteen, and Harry Reid a staggering seventy times between 2007 and 2013. This exponential increase, documented in Chapter 3, fed a tactical arms race: minority parties responded by filibustering the motion to proceed, making unanimous consent agreements the only reliable path to pass legislation.

6. Why does the author believe transparency can backfire?

Chapter 5 (“The Dark Side of Sunlight”) argues that laws like FOIA and the Sunshine Act chill candid communication. The Northern Ireland peace process required secret talks after public breakdown; Lincoln privately persuaded Thaddeus Stevens; C‑SPAN turned debate into performance. Washington State’s redistricting commission and Obama’s retreat from openness pledges illustrate the tension. High‑functioning institutions (HPSCI, Supreme Court, Fed) operate with privacy. The lesson: effective deliberation needs a balance between transparency and confidentiality.

7. What made the Ryan‑Murray budget deal an exception to gridlock?

In 2013, House Budget Chair Paul Ryan and Senate Budget Chair Patty Murray negotiated a last‑minute deal to avoid a government shutdown. Both credited their personal bond—they bonded over football and fishing. Murray noted they “learned to listen, respect, and trust each other.” Ryan said they agreed not to require the other to violate a core principle. Chapter 4 presents this as a rare example of what is possible when lawmakers invest time in genuine human connection.

8. How did the Watergate Babies reforms inadvertently empower party leaders?

The 1970s reform wave, driven by the “Watergate Babies,” was meant to increase transparency and weaken seniority. Instead, it concentrated power in the Speaker’s office. Chapter 6 traces how Speakers Jim Wright and Newt Gingrich used closed rules and centralized control, leading to jurisdictional chaos (the “spork effect”). The Agriculture Committee oversaw derivatives; Homeland Security had 108 panels. The rise of ad‑hoc “gangs” in the Senate was a workaround. The chapter argues that restoring committee authority could reduce gridlock.

9. Why does the author oppose eliminating the filibuster entirely?

Eliminating the filibuster would turn the Senate into a “majority institution,” destroying the need for consensus‑building, according to former senator Olympia Snowe, quoted in Chapter 3. The author favors a negotiated détente: majority leaders stop filling the tree, and minorities commit to letting legislation reach the floor. The 2013 nuclear option for nominees was a flawed precedent; the goal should be to preserve the ability of 41 senators to hold up legislation while restoring good‑faith amendments.

10. What role did the Monocle restaurant play in Washington’s social fabric?

The Monocle, opened during the Eisenhower Administration, was a regular gathering place for politicians from both parties. Chapter 4 describes it as a place “where laws are debated, where policies are set, where the course of world history is changed.” Regulars included Kennedy and Nixon. The decline of such venues—along with the shift to a commuter Congress, fewer days in session, and the loss of the Senate bar—eroded the personal relationships that once enabled bipartisan deal‑making.

11. How did Senator Bob Dole and Senator George McGovern maintain friendship despite intense conflict?

Dole and McGovern argued all day about Vietnam, but in the evenings “we would talk about food for poor people,” Dole recalled at a BPC event. Chapter 4 uses this relationship to illustrate that heartfelt disagreement did not calcify ties or preclude collaboration. The anecdote is part of a broader argument that personal relationships can survive ideological fire as long as lawmakers spend informal time together—a practice that has largely vanished.

12. What does the 2012 BPC gala honoring Howard Baker and Bob Dole reveal about current gridlock?

The gala showcased bipartisan affection, with Vice President Biden lauding Dole’s dignity. Yet the moment was deflated when Senate leaders Reid and McConnell blamed gridlock on the Founding Fathers. Reid said the Senate is dysfunctional “because of the Founding Fathers”; McConnell argued the Senate was “designed to be slow and painful.” The Conclusion rejects this fatalism, arguing that the real cause is the loss of personal relationships, not the constitutional design. Incremental reforms—more committee work, less camera scrutiny—can rebuild collegiality.

13. Why does the author call the era of the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act a “golden age”?

The Act reduced House committees from four dozen to nineteen, halved Senate panels, and gave each committee exclusive jurisdiction. This enabled committees to become “productive engines of public policy,” independent of floor leadership. Chapter 6 notes that committee members spent time together, traveled, and developed camaraderie as strong as party ties. The period illustrates that small‑group collaboration in committees can outperform centralized control, a lesson the author believes modern Congress has forgotten.

14. How did campaign finance reforms create “immaculate dysfunction”?

Post‑Abramoff ethics rules produced absurdities like the “toothpick rule” and a ban on a $12 coffee mug. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act drove money into Super PACs and dark money (501(c)(4) organizations). Earmarks, once a tool for building coalitions, were eliminated. Chapter 7 argues these well‑intended reforms backfired: over‑regulation hindered collaboration and travel, while money simply flowed to less transparent channels. The author calls for balancing integrity with functionality.

15. What does the “Silver Buckshot” reform proposal entail?

Chapter 8 proposes a package of incremental fixes—automatic voter registration, open primaries, streamlined confirmations, and small‑donor matching—rather than a single silver bullet. The goal is to attract better leaders by reducing the burden of fundraising (4+ hours daily) and the risk of ideological primaries. Examples include Nancy Killefer’s nomination withdrawn over a minor tax error and Senator Bob Bennett’s ouster by a tiny caucus. The author argues that these reforms, though modest, can restore faith in government.